Midweek Review: Minnesota 17-20 Wisconsin (OT)

Minnesota and Wisconsin fans would each rather their teams lose Paul Bunyan's Axe than not play at all, so regardless of the outcome Saturday, the fact the trophy was on the line at all for the 130th time felt like a gift. Maybe not a gift they should have gotten, considering the risks of playing any sport in a pandemic, but one that felt good to receive anyway.

In the end, however, the Badgers are the ones who won the Axe. It was a tight, at times ugly contest in which 14 of 23 possessions ended in either a punt or a field goal attempt. If Wisconsin had lost, the story of the game would have been about absent players (both new and held over from previous weeks) and an underperforming quarterback. Instead, it's about how Minnesota intentionally ran into a brick wall and couldn't take capitalize on their opponents' difficulties moving the ball.

1. Minnesota was predictable on 1st downs, and it hurt them.

Let me take you through the typical Minnesota 1st down in this game. It went something like this:

STEP 1: GOPHERS LINE UP

STEP 2: TANNER MORGAN CHECKS WITH SIDELINE

STEP 3: WISCONSIN BRINGS DOWN EXTRA DEFENDER

STEP 4: GOPHERS RUN INTO PACKED BOX

If that seems like an exaggeration or oversimplification, it probably is. But the broad point is true: Minnesota ran on 72.4 percent of 1st downs; if you only count their possessions before the Gophers' final drive of regulation, when they were trying to quickly move the ball and win the game, their 1st down run rate was 80 percent. Twenty-one of Minnesota's 33 rushing attempts came on 1st down.

It is clear that the gameplan was to stick with their favored approach of establishing the run on early downs. This strategy was chosen despite the fact the Gophers were facing arguably the nation's top rushing defense, which clearly was prepared for such an approach.

The results may not look bad at a glance: 5.1 yards per carry on 1st downs suggests this was fairly successful. But yards per carry can a misleading statistic; how those yards were accumulated matters at least as much as how many there were. And the way the Gophers got those yards was by infrequent big plays rather than by efficiency.

You can find explanations for each stat here.
Line Yards and Success Rate are via
collegefootballdata.com

These numbers are for the whole game, but those just for 1st downs are nearly the same. More often than not, Wisconsin stopped the Gophers around the line. Every once in a while, the Gophers broke a big run. It was the definition of boom-or-bust.

As I covered last week: Getting big plays is obviously good. But becoming almost exclusively reliant on big plays is bad because of their rarity. This is even truer in the run game, where big plays are even harder to come by.

Should Minnesota have stopped running entirely? No; it's not like the passing game excelled, and the Gophers actually ran the ball at a lower rate (53 percent) than they had in any close game this season. But the Badgers were ready for the run, especially on 1st downs. Either the coaches didn't catch on or were too stubborn to change their strategy, which has been a theme for the offense for a while.

2. While it was broadly too rigid, the Gopher offense mixed it up in big spots.

It would be easy to say attribute this loss to an unimaginative gameplan by Mike Sanford and Matt Simon. It's true that they ran the ball too often, at least in particular situations. But it would be a lie to say that they didn't use more of the playbook than is their wont.

On 1st-and-goal, for example, the Gophers used a designed quarterback run — exotic by their standards. After faking to Mohamed Ibrahim, Morgan ran a draw. It might have scored if Ibrahim had done better as lead blocker; regardless, it was a good play that brought up 2nd down from the 2-yard line.

Later, on 3rd-and-1 in the 4th quarter, Sanford went to the Green Line package, with two tight ends and an extra lineman up front. Normally out of this look, the only question would be whether Seth Green or Ibrahim was running the ball. As such, at the snap, all 11 Badgers were within 5 yards of the line of scrimmage. But instead of running or handing off, Green flicked the ball to Bryce Witham, who was too far behind the defense for Wisconsin to react in time. It was a 20-yard gain.

To close that drive and tie the game, Minnesota exploited a Wisconsin blitz and man-match coverage. The Badgers' three defensive backs on the trips side were in man coverage according to who was furthest from the sideline: Mike Brown-Stephens was the No. 1, being the closest; Daniel Jackson was the No. 2, being the next-closest; and Clay Geary was the No. 3, as he was the third-closest. (The same numbering system works for receivers next to the opposite sideline.)

Of note: The linebacker and safety opposite the trips rushed the passer when
their men didn't run routes.

However, the way man-match works is that assignments can change when the ball is snapped. The defender covering the No. 2, for example, is responsible for the No. 2 the entire play — but as the play develops, if a different receiver takes a route that makes him the player second-closest to the sideline, he becomes the new No. 2, and therefore that defender's responsibility.

Minnesota attacked this coverage with a play possibly related to the follow concept that also came with a pick. Geary ran a post (or something approximating one), with Jackson running a corner route and Brown-Stephens taking a slant underneath to follow Geary.

The intersection of Jackson and Brown-Stephens meant the secondary's assignments changed. Safety Madison Cone, originally responsible for Brown-Stephens, now had Jackson; Deron Harrell, on Jackson at first, now was on Brown-Stephens. Meanwhile, Geary's post occupied both his own man and the single-high safety. Cone walled off Jackson, but Harrell realized too late that Brown-Stephens was his man and was therefore uncovered.

Altogether, the play looked like this:

It was a smart way to attack the Badgers based on their scheme and avoid their pass rush.

Possibly Sanford's best call, however, will go forgotten due to poor execution. On 3rd-and-3 in overtime, Minnesota set up a throwback to Witham on a rollout. If Morgan had led his tight end, it would have been a touchdown. But with a blitzer closing in, Morgan could only get off a hurried hop-throw that didn't have the strength needed, and the pass was nearly intercepted.

It's fair to question where some of these plays — and, more broadly, this level of creativity — have been for most of the season. The Gophers do tend to stick to their "bread and butter" offensive style most weeks, to their detriment. But while they were guilty of that to a degree Saturday, as covered in the first section, Sanford and Simon deserve credit for the elevated variety on display versus Wisconsin.

(Thanks to Daniel House for his assistance with some of the X's and O's of this section.)

3. The Minnesota passing game was unremarkable but not ineffective.

Because of what the rushing attack was up against, it was vital that the Gophers get something going through the air. And they kind of did, though it was far from a stellar day. The Gophers averaged 6.9 yards per attempt — not horrible, especially considering that the receiver group missed Chris Autman-Bell for the second half and bits of the first, but below the team's usual standards.

Morgan's 52-percent completion rate was the third-lowest of his college career in games where he attempted double-digit passes. A couple drops, a batted pass at the line, and an illegal touching call against Jackson deflated that figure a bit, but he wasn't at his best.

The Wisconsin defense's biggest weakness this season has been allowing big plays, particularly in the passing game. Minnesota needed the hit their deep passes, and they didn't. Morgan attempted four throws of at least 20 yards and completed zero. (His fifth-deepest pass, from the 9-yard line to 9 yards into the end zone, Ky Thomas dropped.) Some of that might be attributable to pressure; Morgan was sacked twice (fumbling the ball the second time), and he had to rush throws at times.

The Gophers still were able to get their play-action game going. See how one of their favorite concepts off of play-action, the bubble-slant combination, resulted in a 22-yard gain for Jackson:

While Minnesota couldn't get much done down the field, they still kept on schedule with plays like this. Their passing success rate (via collegefootballdata.com) was 41.7 percent for the game — basically average, but enough to make their lack of explosiveness less of an issue.

4. Neither team took advantage of their scoring opportunities, but Minnesota had the game's most consequential red zone failure.

In six trips inside the Wisconsin 40-yard line, Minnesota scored 17 points — just 2.8 points per trip. Wisconsin did barely any better going the other way, scoring 20 points on seven trips for an average of 2.9 points. (This does count overtime, which obviously hands an offense a free trip inside the 40.) It was a poor showing for both offenses.

Of course, Minnesota could have not only done better by this statistic, but perhaps taken control of the game by not squandering an important opportunity to score in the second quarter. It appeared that Ibrahim had scored a touchdown from the 2-yard line, but it was waved off by a holding call against sixth lineman Nathan Boe. So the Gophers reset from the 12, and Morgan threw his worst pass of the game.

Safety Eric Burrell barely had to move. Morgan has had issues locking onto his intended target before, and this was a fresh example of that burning him.

Of course, it's not like the playcall gave him many options.

So... is Autman-Bell supposed to walk this slant? Because that seems like a real
bad coaching point to give on a play with three receivers running routes.

Regardless of whoever deserves more fault: It was a disastrous outcome to a drive that, in a close game without many red zone trips, was crucial. The Gophers had to capitalize on this chance.

5. Wisconsin ran the ball worse than any earlier Minnesota opponent, but the Badgers avoided negative plays enough to keep in the game.

The once-dominant Wisconsin rushing attack has been reduced to merely okay this season. With two members of the running back rotation and two starting linemen gone versus Minnesota, it was a little less than that. The Badgers were neither particularly efficient or explosive (aside from Garrett Groshek's 39-yard touchdown).

With Wisconsin not mounting much of a threat over the top, Minnesota played less nickel than they normally do; linebackers Mariano Sori-Marin, James Gordon, and Josh Aune were frequently on the field at the same time. And when defensive coordinator Joe Rossi didn't play a 4-3, he plugged in some different players on the defensive line to help against the rush. Logan Richter, usually a nose tackle, played 3-technique on this down, and instead of sack leader Boye Mafe at rush end, it was Thomas Rush.

Rossi's priority was slowing down the run, and it mostly worked. The biggest issue was that the Gophers stopped only four carries at or behind the line of scrimmage. Wisconsin still moved the ball passably, and that kept the offense from totally stalling out. At times, they even had stretches like Groshek's string of 8 carries for 51 yards over the Badgers' last two regulation drives. Though it was Minnesota's best performance against the run all year, it wasn't a dominant one.

6. Graham Mertz, facing a worse defense than in prior weeks, looked about as unremarkable.

The hype for Mertz went thermonuclear after he threw for 248 yards and five touchdowns against Illinois to open the season, but the former four-star recruit has not come close to that level of performance since. His 56-percent completion rate and 9.9 yards per completion in his other five games are the numbers of an uncomfortable freshman who has been inaccurate despite seldom being asked to throw downfield.

One could point to the quality of Mertz's competition — two elite defenses sandwiching one very good one — over the three games preceding Minnesota as evidence that his struggles were not entirely his fault. But Minnesota has been far worse defensively that competition, and Mertz still was ineffective. He attempted few challenging passes, encountered nearly no pass rush, and not infrequently saw open receivers, but he still missed his throws.

He finished the day 12-for-20 with 132 yards, leaving injured in the third quarter after being hit hard on a run. He hit a couple big throws on that drive, suggesting he had perhaps begun to settle and keeping the Badgers in the game. But overall, it was another disappointing evening for a player who as a redshirt freshman did not often sustain the great potential he has flashed at moments.

7. Wisconsin made progress on of slant-flat combinations tied to rollouts.

Though the Badgers didn't try much downfield, they picked up smaller chunks here and there, mostly by attacking the outside of the Gopher defense. One way they did that was with rub routes to the same side of a rollout. The moving pocket required defenders to account for the quarterback while giving the rub on the outside enough time to develop. At that point, Wisconsin had a receiver in space.

The Badgers went back to the concept multiple times, including on Chase Wolf's touchdown pass in the third quarter. The protection looked a bit different from in the above play, but the slant-flat combination and rollout were the same, just reversed. (Both times, the receiver was Jack Dunn.)

This concept was a simple but effective way for the Badgers to pick up a few yards at a time against man coverage.

8. The Gopher defense didn't disrupt the Badgers' passing game often enough but made important tackles.

Bill Connelly, maybe college football's preeminent nerd, has used what he calls havoc plays as a broad measure of a defense's (or defender's) disruptiveness. (I've discussed them in this space before, most recently in my review of the Iowa game.) A havoc play is a tackle for loss (including a sack), any pass defensed (broken up or intercepted), or a forced fumble. As an example, Mafe has 5.5 tackles for loss (4.5 sacks), two passes defensed (both broken up) and two forced fumbles on the season, giving him a team-leading 9.5 havoc plays. Simple enough.

On Saturday, Minnesota did generate some havoc plays. It's just that five of them were against the run; the other three were a pass breakup, a (crucial) interception by Coney Durr, and a 1-yard sack. The Gophers' disruptiveness was limited to their front seven, and even then, that front seven barely affected the passing game. While Wisconsin's shorter, quicker throws limit a secondary's ability to wreak havoc, and Mertz and Wolf were far from perfect without much interference from the defense, the Gophers could have made their work easier by breaking up more passes or applying more pressure. They struggled to do either throughout the 2020 season.

What they did better in this game, however, was limit the damage of Wisconsin's completions. Minnesota allowed a pedestrian 9.2 yards per completion. Many of their biggest tackles came on passing downs, when the Badgers threw short of the line to gain and the defense prevented receivers from picking up 1st downs after the catch.

For the game, the Badgers managed a Success Rate of just 16.7 percent on passing downs. (This stat is via collegefootballdata.com.) They also converted four of 12 3rd down attempts. Each figure would rank among the worst in FBS over a full season. So while the Minnesota defense wasn't disruptive, it did its job at some crucial moments.

9. Minnesota's special teams finish the year nowhere near where they need to be.

The Gophers have experienced a myriad of special teams adventures this year. A missed field goal in overtime is just another example, but it would be wrong to hone in on that when it was third-string placekicker Anders Gelecinskyj's first miss in eight kicks (including PATs), and when the position has been a consistent problem. Meanwhile, Minnesota's kick returners have averaged 17.3 yards per return, the 18th-lowest mark in FBS, and Mark Crawford has averaged 37.4 net yards per punt.

Aside from improved kickoff coverage, the Gophers have been poor in this phase of the game. Some of it was surely due to inexperience, injuries, and COVID-19-related problems. But it's hard to say how much, especially when last year's special teams were also a relative weakness and when obvious solutions (mainly replacing Cam Wiley as returner) went unimplemented for so long. It is fair to believe that at this point this area of the team is at least becoming a habitual problem under P.J. Fleck. If 2021 doesn't show improvement, there will be no doubt that it is one.

10. With no bowl to follow, this loss closes a frustrating but far from hopeless 2020 season.

Minnesota's year is over after the program joined several others in FBS in deciding not to accept bowl invitations, citing the importance of player health. College football returning in the first place was always a threat to those players' health — both physical and mental — but now they get to spend some much-deserved time away from the demands of the sport.

The 3-4 mark they leave in the record books appears now as an eventful, often stressful disappointment after the program's breakout 2019. But it should be remembered in time as a reset, not a regression.

Minnesota was competitive in all but two games despite all of their problems, the majority of which can be distilled to one word: youth. The step back the Gophers took was larger than anticipated due to injuries and pandemic-related issues, from lost practices to absent players. Experience might have been more important than ever this season, and the Gophers were short on it, especially on defense. In normal circumstances, they might not have started as cold, they would probably not have had so many players miss games, and they almost definitely wouldn't have had two games canceled.

Sure, the reshaped offensive braintrust has disappointed, in ways both new and painfully familiar. And despite some steps forward, Minnesota's defense was poor most of the year. Still: After multiple strong recruiting classes, with several underclassmen and first-time regulars gaining experience and demonstrably improving, the overall trajectory of the program remains positive.

With the NCAA not counting this season towards eligibility, Minnesota may retain as many as 20 starters between offense and defense. If none of the seniors who have not made their post-2020 plans known stick around (Durr will; Benjamin St-Juste will not), that number may be 16, with experienced players filling the vacant spots. The Gophers' youth and often large positional rotations mean they have real depth.

Teams succeed in this sport with talent and experience. Fleck's Minnesota is accumulating both. The question is not whether the Gophers will compete for a West title again, but when.