Checking on the 2026 Gophers after Six Games

It is easy to call Minnesota's 41-13 loss at Purdue a classic case of falling victim to a "trap game." I do not generally entertain armchair psychology, but even granting the premise, I still disagree: Even after two successive emotional wins over big-name (and, at the time, dubiously ranked) teams, Minnesota had a bye immediately after their trip to West Lafayette. How could the Gophers look past a team when there was no bigger test on the other side? Would Purdue's win over Illinois not have kept them on their toes?

The problem was not that the program does "a good job at handling adversity and not as well as handling success" — it is that these Gophers are rather middling.

Entering the game, Bill Connelly's SP+ had Minnesota (53rd) ranked 28 spots ahead of Purdue (81st), with a 66-percent chance to win. While the Gophers were deserving favorites, they remained a flawed team whose schedule to date looked worse with each week. Teams like that are fully capable of dropping a game to  opponents with even bigger flaws.

I will not pretend, however, that I was not surprised by the magnitude of the defeat. In the Big Ten, only Rutgers has a worse defense than Purdue. One could foresee the Boilermakers having a shot in a shootout, but for the Gophers to score just 13 points rather than keeping pace underscores just how low the floor is on this offense.

Their most consistent problem is the offensive line. There were already questions about this group before losing the starting center, Ashton Beers, three games into the season. Without preferred backup Brett Carroll, who suffered an injury in the preseason, Greg Johnson has stepped back into the middle and been as superb a blocker as he was at guard. Beers' absence has still had severe knock-on effects.

Take offensive coordinator Greg Harbaugh Jr.'s attempts to introduce more gap scheme. It was easy to imagine how this might open up the rushing attack.

With Johnson at guard, Minnesota could pull their most athletic lineman into open space on counter to the right. The slower Tony Nelson and the young D.J. Shipp, the playside guard and tackle, would have down blocks, which are easier than trying to reach across a defender's face on outside zone. Even if running counter the other way would be tougher, having one run play that gets Darius Taylor and T.J. Thomas into space on the edge would be an improvement.

Harbaugh has also shown how pullers can complement the passing attack. Watch how these Michigan linebackers hesitated instead of darting towards this bubble screen because Nelson's movement told them something was happening on the back side of the play:

But to actually run counter, you need the right personnel. With Johnson at center, the slower Jaden Ball took over at left guard. The Gophers ran counter right seven times at Washington and gained 11 yards. Ball just was not equipped for the job.

After the trip to Seattle, Ball missed the Michigan and Purdue games, which required the Gophers to repurpose Bennett Warren as the new left guard. It is valuable experience for Warren, who may have to kick inside to start on the 2027 line, but he was already a project at tackle. He is figuring out where to go off of double teams and how to handle late stunts. He also shed weight since leaving Tennessee and, in his third year of college football, is still developing physically. In Warren's spot, it is admirable to get by, and he is a more mobile blocker than Ball. If he was a good enough guard to start there, though, it would not have taken three injuries for him to start.

Meanwhile at right tackle, Shipp has played like a redshirt freshman. Based on his spring game, the first real chance to evaluate him, I understood why the coaches project big things for him. As Johnson's career has shown, however, linemen take time to develop. Shipp leads the Gopher O-line with four penalties (three false starts, one hold). At times, he is clearly just trying to survive against defensive linemen who have spent more time on a college field and in the weight room. It can look clumsy.

It should also be said that, for all of Johnson's strengths, one can see occasional confusion up front. On the following mid zone run, Taylor had a crease, but he could only gain 1 yard after Purdue nose tackle Curt Neal went practically unblocked.

With middle linebacker Jojo Hayden cheating toward the B gap, and the whole line stepping laterally, Nelson did the right thing (not extraordinarily) and got a hand on Neal before climbing to Hayden. Johnson, though, went straight to the second level rather than initiating the double with Neal. The window closed because one of the Gophers' senior linemen made the wrong call or did not make any call. If Beers was at center, issues like this might not occur.

Add in some inconsistent blocking from Minnesota's inexperienced tight ends, and the problems are rampant. Brian Callahan, longtime offensive line coach and run game coordinator, had big questions to answer this season. So far, even granting the challenges posed by major injuries, his line has not produced good answers.

Whether it is widening his receivers' splits to take defenders out of the box or finding ways to pull his center (both things Mississippi State did against Minnesota), Harbaugh needs to find ways to improve the ground game at the margins. But that will not fix the problem when the Gophers are deficient at their bread and butter run concepts. They are just bad at running the ball. It is the big reason why, in their four games against power-conference opponents, they have scored just four touchdowns on 21 drives that crossed the opposing 40-yard line.

Until they get better up front — which could eventually happen, considering three underclassmen are starting — the lack of a rushing attack will hamstring the offense.

There are broader philosophical issues as well. It is not inherently wrong to have a ball-control-oriented identity on offense, but leaning too far into it creates downstream problems. When the operation is too slow, hurries pre-snap checks, makes it easier for defenders to jump the snap, and creates opportunities for P.J. Fleck to needlessly burn timeouts to avoid delay of game penalties. While Harbaugh cleaned up these issues shortly after becoming playcaller in 2023 — a necessity with his added shifts and motions — they have resurfaced in 2026. Harbaugh, for being in charge of the offense, and Fleck, for his longstanding obsession with time of possession, share the blame for that.

The passing game also lacks explosiveness. While Harbaugh can and should be more aggressive, the bigger problem is at quarterback.

Statistically, Drake Lindsey's gains over his first season as starter have been marginal. His 6.8 yards per attempt mark is an improvement over last year (6.1) but sits just outside the top 100 in FBS. According to Game on Paper, his success rate is up 2 points (to 41 percent), and his Expected Points Added per dropback is basically a wash (0.05 in 2025 to 0.03 in 2026). It should be noted that these stats include sacks, which are fewer this year thanks to clean pockets and a lot of horizontal pass calls.

In most ways, Lindsey looks the same as he did last season. He can zip balls over the middle into tight windows inaccessible to other quarterbacks. He also can struggle with touch and placement, gunning short- and intermediate-range passes to the outer limits of a receiver's catch radius and preventing yards after catch. Considering he is a redshirt sophomore, it is understandable that Lindsey is still getting a feel for this part of passing, even if you want to see progress.

What has been more worrisome are a few moments where Lindsey has failed to properly calculate risk. He is already up to five interceptions this season, just one behind his 2025 season total, and four of the five were on plays where he made bad choices.

On this play versus Akron, Lindsey had a chance to scramble (lumber, really) for a few yards to his left after no receiver came open. If he somehow failed to convert, he would still have had 3rd down. Pierce Walsh, with no one to block, was even releasing late into the flat for a checkdown. Instead, Lindsey hurled a ball to a well-covered Jalen Smith. While the bounce was unfair, the outcome was not.

In the Washington game, Lindsey again took an unnecessary risk. After Johnson delivered a low snap and Ball failed to pick up a stunt on the left side, Lindsey was forced out of the pocket to his right. Taylor was the only receiver facing him, but Lindsey was well out of the pocket and easily could have thrown the ball away. It would have meant a punt, sure, but sometimes a punt is the best outcome. Instead, with one linebacker underneath and a second on top of Taylor, Lindsey floated a pass he never should have considered. The Huskies started with potentially 30 more yards of field position than Tom Weston would have given them.

Many fans have blamed the playcall for Lindsey's second interception against Michigan, and I understand why: The throwback design gave him only one direction to throw, and it came on a drive where Minnesota was finding success through incrementalism. (Lindsey's first interception was the right read, but he took a big hit after Johnson and Nelson poorly handled a disguised blitz.) While it was unfortunately timed against a Michigan corner blitz, and while the design got the space it wanted for Taylor down the sideline, Harbaugh does deserve some criticism for going for the killshot.

Nevertheless, Lindsey bears blame for his error in response to that blitz. Even off his back foot, he has the arm strength to have arced this ball over Taylor's head — probably not for a completion but at least putting it harmlessly out of bounds. Lindsey more easily could have eaten the sack, setting up 2nd and long from the outskirts of field goal range. Instead, he threw the ball on a line and into danger.

Lindsey played his worst half of the season to open the game at Purdue. His rhythm and placement were off, missing open receivers because he didn't throw to them on time or because he was just off-target. He finished the first half 8-for-17 with 115 yards (6.7 per attempt) and no touchdowns. Even if his receivers did not generate consistent separation, he had real chances to make progress down the field.

Like a lot of young quarterbacks, Lindsey can stay glued to the first option in his progression. Here, the Gophers ran a variant of four verticals against Cover 3, with Roman Voss and Noah Jennings essentially swapping routes on the boundary side of the formation.

The key man for Lindsey to read was boundary corner Don Saunders. Saunders lined up with outside leverage on Jennings and had the deep third of the field. He could cheat as far outside as he did pre-snap because he was supposed to have help inside. That help did not exist. Play-action got the linebackers to creep forward, opening up the seam. The single-high safety was too far to the field to come across, and Julian Johnson's vertical occupied his attention anyway.

Saunders was alone against two vertical routes. To stay with Jennings, he would have to get tight to his hip, opening up the wheel for Voss. If Saunders stayed outside, Jennings would have a huge gain. If Lindsey played it right, the cornerback had no right answer to this predicament.

Lindsey's eyes said "wheel" the whole way. Saunders, in response, shaded to the sideline. Easy decision: pivot to the seam. It would be an easy 1st down. Probably a spot in the red zone, maybe even a touchdown.

However, Lindsey's eyes were not lying. He wanted to hit the wheel, and he was not about to consider any alternatives. As soon as he locked onto Voss, his throw needed to be perfect. It was not, and Lindsey narrowly avoided a pick by the recovering Saunders.

The interception Lindsey threw was a much quicker-developing play but the result of the same problem. He waited for Javon Tracy to come out of his break on a slant, noticing neither Hayden settling into the throwing lane nor a more open Smith running his own slant from the left slot.

Stubborn, risky quarterbacking will be a dinner bell to Phil Parker's Iowa defense, who gave Lindsey the worst day of his college career almost exactly a year ago Saturday. They have not generated a takeaway since intercepting Bryce Underwood in Week 4, but their 10 combined sacks over the last two games underscore how vital it is Lindsey cleans up his game.

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We have seen Minnesota teams get by with an underwhelming offense before, however. The truly distressing side of the ball is the U of M defense.

I will first grant that the pass defense may have improved. Aydan West has been a viable starting cornerback opposite John Nestor, and Naiim Parrish has made a few plays when he has rotated onto the field. Opponents have completed 59.1 percent of their passes and averaged 10.9 yards per catch. Last year's Gophers kept plays in front of them but allowed a 67.0 completion rate, one of the highest in FBS.

Mississippi State's Kamario Taylor had an excellent day against Minnesota, but one roughly in line with his pre-injury output this season. Ryan Browne, one of the most efficient passers in the Big Ten, averaged a pedestrian 6.6 yards per attempt. These are the only two legitimate quarterbacks Minnesota has faced — depending on how much of Demond Williams' struggles you pin on his patchwork supporting cast — and the secondary did not shine in either case, but things were in a far worse way a year ago.

The main reason for Minnesota's disastrous defensive performances in those two games was an inability to stop the run. The Bulldogs and Boilermakers combined for 566 non-sack yards and a 54.3-percent success rate (according to Game on Paper), averaging 6.2 yards per carry. Former Gopher Fame Ijeboi ran for the most yards by a Purdue player in nine years.

Here are some key stats from the four power-conference games:

Carries exclude sacks. Non-traditional stats are via
Game on Paper. For definitions, see here.

The Gophers are stopping runs at or behind the line of scrimmage (stuff rate) at a basically average rate, yet are allowing runs of at least 4 yards (highlight opportunity rate) at one of the highest rates in America. How is that possible?

There are three big reasons: First is the Minnesota front. We knew entering the year that the Gophers lacked power-conference experience in the middle, and that has cost them. They have shuffled seven players through the two tackle spots, which does not count those who have appeared in their ultra-light pass rush package.

The most effective tackle on the team, Riley Sunram, has so far justified his 4-star rating as a prospect and made 5.5 tackles for loss. He is still a redshirt sophomore who has his ups and downs against more mature, bigger linemen. Theorin Randle and Naquan Crowder had to play together more often against Purdue after Sunram's early injury and gave mixed showings that matched their season-long performances. The Gophers are missing a true, every-down lane-clogger.

Linebackers Joey Gerlach and Matt Kingsbury have also been inconsistent. Gerlach, a local product and longtime rotational player who missed the last chunk of 2025 with an injury, has been one of the 2026 team's nicest stories by leading the team with 7.5 havoc plays in increased snaps. He looked out of control at Purdue, however, missing tackles and allowing bigger gains. Kingsbury, when healthy, has looked better around the line of scrimmage but had a nightmarish day chasing Taylor and Fluff Bothwell around against Mississippi State. Maverick Baranowski has done his part but has his limitations. The Gophers have not quite found the ideal partner for him.

The last reason is the scheme. Danny Collins has emphasized a "H.A.V.O.C." identity, continuing the increased aggressiveness that Corey Heatherman brought to the defense in 2024. This has meant regularly blitzing quarterbacks on around 40 percent of dropbacks, an approach that produced the most sacks in the Big Ten last year.

Blitzing so much comes with drawbacks. Under Collins, the Gophers have played more single-high and man coverages, leaving their cornerbacks on islands whenever they send extra rushers. In 2025, Minnesota was starting from scratch at corner, so this approach exacerbated an existing weakness. With better players at the position in 2026, the same downside exists but is reduced.

The more immediate risk is how blitzing affects the run fit. One of the risks a defense takes when they blitz or stunt is that, if the opponent runs the ball, someone is out of position. Much like how a screen pass takes advantage of vacated space, a run that squeaks through the initial wave of defenders on a blitz puts the ballcarrier into loads of space.

Against a team like Michigan, whose offense is hamstrung by bad quarterback play and rigid adherence to heavy personnel, the risk is negated. Collins threw players into the backfield because he correctly bet that the Wolverines could not punish the Gophers through the air. The Michigan line got movement, but their backs had no access to the second level.

Offenses like Mississippi State and Purdue, though, spread out defenses with their formations and passing. With their receivers practically on the sidelines, the Bulldogs mandate the only defenders around the line of scrimmage be linemen and linebackers. By my charting of that game, Minnesota had six or fewer players in the box on 46 of 70 snaps. When Taylor at least feigned read option on nearly every play, that put Minnesota's linebackers in conflict, functionally taking another defender out of the run fit. That was a numbers advantage that Bothwell was too good to squander.

When Purdue split out their receivers and ran counter, Minnesota again lacked numbers and gave up ground. When Collins ran a twist or sent an ineffective blitz, Ijeboi had limitless open grass.

Purdue also eliminated Anthony Smith, Minnesota's best lineman, from play by targeting him on read option or running away from him. Smith is a bully at end, but he is too slow to contain the edge without help behind him, or to chase down plays from behind without a bit more resistance on the front side of the line. For the first time all season, he registered no tackles for loss.

Minnesota is still developing a defensive interior that can consistently win the line of scrimmage. That is, in a way, forgivable at the moment. Deven Eastern and Jalen Logan-Redding did not have infinite eligibility. Perhaps especially in this transfer-heavy era, a program like Minnesota will have to face resets somewhere on the roster. You accept that in exchange for positive results a year or two into the future. It is worth waiting to see if defensive line coach C.J. Robbins is building something.

Less forgivable are the systemic issues. Minnesota's poor tackling and reckless, dogmatic blitzing mark a major decline. Fleck's best teams could hang with anyone thanks to their defenses. This team can shut down opponents who lack an offensive line or a quarterback. Collins — whose own position group, safety, has gotten worse since he became coordinator — deserved this second season but is surely coaching for his job the rest of the way.

Despite all the real negatives, Minnesota is still 4-2. While beating Indiana in Bloomington may just about be hopeless, and UCLA looks more frightening every week, it takes just two wins to go bowling. Iowa's only big-play threat is Kamari Moulton, and their defense may be merely very good rather than elite. Penn State, who just took a fourth straight loss, has myriad offensive problems. Northwestern bizarrely struggled to put away Michigan State. Wisconsin quarterback Colton Joseph is one of the best scramblers in college football but averages only 6.4 yards per attempt against power-conference teams. There are opportunities.

This season was never about chasing a playoff berth, but figuring out what parts of this team do and do not work before clicking into place in 2027. With the right tweaks over the bye, Minnesota can accomplish that goal and renew optimism after catastrophe.